Remarks on Lorenz and Piaget by Bischof, Norbert
Language and Learning 
The Debate between Jean Piaget 
and Noam Chomsky 
Edited by 
M A S S I M O P I A T T E L L I - P A L M A R I N I 
R O U T L E D G E & K E G A N P A U L 
London, Melbourne and Henley 
CONTENTS 
PREFACE Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini xiii 
FOREWORD Howard Gardner xix 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 1 
Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini: How Hard Is the 
"Hard Core" of a Scientific Program* 
PART I The Debate 
1. OPENING THE DEBATE 23 
Jean Piaget The Psychogenesis of Knowledge 
and Its Epistemological Significance 
Noam Chomsky On Cognitive Structures and 
Their Development: A Reply to Piaget 
2. ABOUT THE FIXED NUCLEUS 
A N D ITS INNATENESS 55 
Jean Piaget Introductory Remarks 
Discussion by Frangois Jacob, Jean Piaget, Jean-Pierre 
Changeux, Stephen Toulmin, Noam Chomsky, 
Anthony Wilden 
Guy Cellerier Cognitive Strategies 
in Problem Solving 
Discussion by Noam Chomsky, Massimo Piattelli-
Palmarini, Gregory Bateson, Antoine Danchin, Jerry 
Fodor, Dan Sperber, Guy Cellerier, Jean Piaget, 
Frangois Jacob, Scott Atran 
Guy Celterier Some Clarifications on 
Innatism and Constructivism 
3. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE A N D GENERAL 
DEVELOPMENTAL MECHANISMS 89 
Seymour Papert The Role of Artificial 
Intelligence in Psychology 
Discussion by Noam Chomsky, Seymour Papert, Scott 
Atran 
ix 
χ / Contents 
4. INITIAL STATES A N D STEADY STATES 107 
Noam Chomsky The Linguistic Approach 
Discussion by Anthony Wilden, Noam Chomsky, 
Seymour Papert, Dieter Dütting, David Premack, Dan 
Sperber 
5. COGNITIVE SCHEMES A N D THEIR POSSIBLE 
RELATIONS TO LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 131 
Bärbel Inhelder Language and Knowledge in a 
Constructivist Framework 
Discussion by Noam Chomsky, Seymour Papert, Jerry 
Fodor, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Bärbel Inhelder, 
Jacques Monod 
6. O N THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACQUIRING 
"MORE POWERFUL" STRUCTURES 142 
Jerry Fodor Fixation of Belief 
and Concept Acquisition 
Discussion by Seymour Papert, Jerry Fodor, Jean 
Piaget, Anthony Wilden, Dieter Dütting, Jacques 
Monod, Noam Chomsky, Scott Atran 
7. LANGUAGE W I T H I N COGNITION 163 
Jean Piaget Schemes of Action 
and Language Learning 
Discussion by Noam Chomsky, Jean Piaget, Bärbel 
Inhelder, Jerry Fodor, Seymour Papert, Dan Sperber, 
David Premack, Jacques Monod, Stephen Toulmin 
8. PROPERTIES OF THE NEURONAL NETWORK 184 
Jean-Pierre Changeux Genetic Determinism 
and Epigenesis of the Neuronal Network: Is 
There a Biological Compromise between 
Chomsky and PiageU 
Discussion by Jean Piaget, Dieter Dütting, Jean-Pierre 
Changeux, Jacques Monod, Noam Chomsky 
9. INTERSPECIES COMPARISONS OF COGNITIVE 
ABILITIES 203 
David Premack Representational Capacity and 
Accessibility of Knowledge: The Case of 
Chimpanzees 
Discussion by Gregory Bateson, David Premack, 
Maurice Godelier, Seymour Papert, Scott Atran, 
Norbert Bischof, Anthony Wilden 
Contents I x i 
10. PHYLOGENESIS A N D COGNITION 231 
Norbert Bischof Remarks on Lorenz and Piaget: 
How Can "Working Hypotheses" Be 
"Necessary"* 
Comments by Jean Piaget 
11. COGNITION A N D THE SEMIOTIC FUNCTION 244 
Dan Sperber Remarks on the Lack of Positive 
Contributions from Anthropologists to the 
Problem of Innateness 
Discussion by Seymour Papert, Dan Sperber, Noam 
Chomsky, David Premack, Jerry Fodor 
12. THE INDUCTIVIST FALLACY 255 
Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor Statement of 
the Paradox 
Discussion by Thomas de Zengotita, Noam Chomsky, 
Gregory Bateson, David Premack, Seymour Papert, 
Jerry Fodor 
13. AFTERTHOUGHTS A N D CLARIFICATIONS 276 
Stephen Toulmin Steering a Way between 
Constructivism and Innatism 
Jean Piaget Afterthoughts 
PART I I Comments on the Debate 
14. Hilary Putnam What Is Innate and Why: 
Comments on the Debate 287 
15. Noam Chomsky Discussion of Putnam's 
Comments 310 
16. Jerry Fodor Reply to Putnam 325 
17. Hilary Putnam Comments on Chomsky's 
and Fodofs Replies 335 
18. Jacques Mehler Psychology and Psycholinguistics: 
The Impact of Chomsky and Piaget 341 
APPENDIX A 355 
Antoine Danchin A Critical Note on the Use 
of the Term "Phenocopy" 
APPENDIX Β 361 
Rene Thorn The Genesis of Representational 
Space according to Piaget 
Jean Piaget Reply to Thorn 
x i i / Contents 
APPENDIX C 371 
Jean Petitot Localist Hypothesis and 
Theory of Catastrophes: Note on the Debate 
NOTES 380 
INDEX 399 
Remarks on Lorenz and Piaget: 
How Can "Working Hypotheses" 
Be "Necessary"? 
Norbert Bischof 
In his paper, Piaget argues against the viewpoint of Konrad 
Lorenz, who holds that the categories of thinking have de­
veloped i n the process of phylogenetic adaptation of the human 
species to its environment. Logically enough, Lorenz calls these 
categories "innate working hypotheses'' of the human cognitive 
system. Piaget, on his side, feels that the contingent and provi-
sionary status of a "working hypothesis," born out of the hap­
hazard guesswork of mutation, contradicts the "necessary" char­
acter of our cognitive structures. 
I would like to argue i n favor of the Lorenzian view. In par­
ticular, I intend to point out that the notions of "working hy­
pothesis" and "necessity," as used by Lorenz and Piaget, re­
spectively, are not at all contradictory. 
A N EPISTEMOLOGICAL A R G U M E N T 
Lorenz proceeds from an epistemological viewpoint which is 
shared by most other ethologists (and also, for instance, by 
Gestalt psychologists and logical empiricists such as Feigl) and 
which has been labeled "critical realism."* The basic assump­
tions of critical realism are the following: 
1. There is a structured reality, the so-called "objective 
world," the structure of which remains the same whether or not 
there are organisms who perceive i t correctly, or perceive i t at all. 
2. Organisms form a special subset of this "objective world." 
They are characterized by the fact that their behavior can be 
interpreted as "adaptive" i n the sense of optimizing their 
chances of survival. 
3. This adaptiveness defines a mapping relation: for every 
possible behavior of an organism, a set of environmental situa­
tions in which this behavior would be optimally adaptive can be 
* Editor's note: The debate between Putnam, Chomsky, and Fodor in Part 
II brings further clarification of the issue of "critical realism." Putnam is 
considered to be one of the most authoritative exponents of this school of 
thought. 
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assumed to exist. Thus i t can be stated that the behavior of an 
organism contains "information" about the features of the en­
vironment. This information refers to the intersection of all pos­
sible situations i n which the given behavior would be optimally 
adaptive. 
4. The concept of information is, i n this context, not con­
fined to the mere syntactic meaning that i t has i n information 
theory. Rather, i t can be interpreted semantically: we can speak 
of "true" or "false" information depending on whether a be­
havior is in fact adapted to the existing situation or not. This 
should be elucidated by a brief example. There is a set of in­
voluntary eye movements that are controlled by the vestibular 
organ, so-called "vestibular eye reflexes." Among other possibil­
ities, the human eye may, i n a given situation, perform a steady 
rotation i n the horizontal plane; i n other situations, the eyeballs 
may be tilted to a given angle around their sagittal axes. If a 
human organism is subject to a lateral linear acceleration, the 
eyes w i l l perform a reactive movement. However, this move­
ment does not consist of a lateral drift, which would allow the 
person to keep track of the environment passing by, but rather 
consists of a steady t i l t around the optical axis. This response 
would only be adaptive i n the context of a lateral body t i l t ; in 
this case i t would help to maintain the stability of the retinal 
image. Thus we can describe the situation i n terms of the or­
ganism having "misinterpreted" the lateral linear movement as 
a steady body t i l t (actually, the lateral acceleration has inter­
fered with the pull of gravity to yield a deflection of the otoliths 
that is equivalent to and indistinguishable from a lateral body 
tilt) . In this case, the "information" contained in the eye move­
ment about the spatial situation of the body is false: to be adap­
tive, the behavior would require a situation that does not exist 
in reality. 
5. The subject of the experiment just described is not aware 
of his (involuntary) eye movements. But if he is asked about his 
subjective experience, he w i l l indeed report the sensation of 
being laterally tilted. In other words, subjective experience cor­
responds to the "information" that the external observer assigns 
to the responses of the organism. Critical realism, now, gen­
erally postulates that our subjective experience (or our "phe­
nomenal world") can be understood as the "information" con­
tained in the totality of our behavioral states of readiness; that 
is, every subject's phenomenal world stands i n a mapping rela­
tion to objective reality, corresponding to i t more or less exactly, 
but by no means identical wi th i t . 
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In everyday life, we do not make this distinction. To my 
naive understanding, there is no other mysterious world beyond 
the world of my immediate experience: the object that emits 
light waves to my eyes, and the object that accordingly appears 
in front of my eyes, are taken to be one and the same, located i n 
one and the same space. This everyday viewpoint is called 
"naive realism"; we get along with i t very well outside our 
laboratories (due to the fact that the mapping apparatus is so in­
genious that i t makes only a very few, minute errors). But even 
as scientists, we have to be very careful not to relapse into 
the naive view when the theoretical situation actually demands 
a more critical position. 
The critical-realistic dichotomy between objective world and 
subjective world is indispensable as soon as we want to deal 
theoretically wi th the concept of "false information," as for 
example, i n the case of an optical illusion, or any kind of cogni­
tive error. In addition, the naive subject engaged i n the struggles 
of everyday life has a vital interest i n the veridicality of 
his cognitive structures. Far from being a mere issue of academic 
epistemology, success i n the attempt to subjectively map objec­
tive reality i n an adequate way does i n fact determine the 
chances of survival. So what the subject vitally needs are cues 
in his phenomenal world that tell h im when there is good reason 
to assume that the cognitive representation is correct. 
At this juncture I w i l l make a brief excursion into the psychol­
ogy of thinking. 
A N A R G U M E N T BORROWED FROM C O G N I T I V E PSYCHOLOGY 
I would like to present the thesis that man's quest for knowledge 
has a structure that is similar, i n principle, to that of a natural 
drive. 
Ethologists usually distinguish two main phases i n a drive 
process, called "appetency" and "consummation." These can be 
distinguished i n the following ways: 
1. Appetency (for example, searching for food) is accom­
panied by a state of tension. In consummation (for example, 
eating), this tension is more or less suddenly reduced. This re­
duction is felt to be pleasurable. 
2. During evolution, appetency behavior becomes more and 
more complex, variable, and sophisticated, whereas consumma­
tion behavior remains comparably primitive, inflexible, and un-
modifiable by experience. 
3. Every natural drive can be expected to have a biological 
meaning, that is, to produce wi th sufficient certainty an effect 
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which directly establishes a selective advantage. However, i n 
spite of its importance, this effect only seldom plays a role i n 
our subjective experience; the fact of whether or not the effect 
occurs touches our passions less than might be expected. The 
reason for this failure is that i t would be too difficult for our 
perceptual apparatus to ascertain the effect directly. Therefore, 
at first we hold fast to an earlier, more accessible l ink of the 
causal chain, which is the consummation. Thus the consumma­
tion is the experienced goal of appetency behavior, even though 
it does not constitute the biological goal. The latter—namely, 
the "effect" mentioned above—is only a sequel of consumma­
tion. 
Thus, for example, i n pairing behavior i t is not the process 
of fertilization itself which is experienced as consummation, but 
rather certain events which are accessory to the transport of 
semen from the male to the female organism, that is, events 
preparatory to fertilization and, indeed, not necessarily entailing 
fertilization. 
We note, therefore, as a matter of principle, that a successful 
consummatory experience, however tension-reducing i t may be, 
never necessarily entails the naturally intended effect. Our emo­
tions, however, do not know this, and i t is only toward consum­
mation that we feel driven, and in which we come to rest. Every­
thing beyond consummation is, at best, a matter for ethics. 
Perhaps the parallelism wi th cognitive behavior w i l l already 
have become clear from the foregoing. Indeed, the analogy is 
striking if we allow for the "act" of cognition occurring in­
ternally rather than i n the realm of observable behavior. 
With cognitive activity, too, we find a more or less complex 
appetency—a state of tension i n which the solution for the prob­
lem is sought by trying out various strategies, by applying past 
experience, and by engaging i n productive thinking. Eventually, 
if we are lucky, this tension is released all of a sudden i n a con­
summatory experience. This consummatory situation has been 
investigated mainly i n Gestalt psychology. I t was called the 
"aha-experience" by Karl Bühler—the sudden emergence of a 
meaning that justifies itself by an unquestionable, cogent evi-
dentness. 
This experience is accompanied, and i n fact caused, by a 
characteristic change i n the cognitive structures at issue. In 
terms of Gestalt psychology, unsolved problems have the char­
acter of "defective structures": they are structures w i t h ap­
parently missing parts, or w i t h parts that contradict each other. 
Generally speaking, problems are structures i n disequilibrium. 
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During the process of productive thinking, we observe sudden 
spurts of equilibration. It is these sudden gains of equilibrium 
and harmony that are emotionally reflected by the "aha-
experience." 
So much for the consummatory situation. The effect, how­
ever, which normally is coupled wi th this consummation, and 
to which this consummation owes its biological existence—this 
effect is the truth of the cognition: " t r u t h " i n the critical-realist 
sense of optimal adaptation of the cognitive structures to objec­
tive reality. 
I n this sense, we can say that whereas truth is the objective 
effect of thinking, the experience of evidentness is its subjective 
goal. Evidentness, as we have seen, grows out of structural equi­
l ibr ium, harmony, and order, which ultimately are aesthetic 
rather than epistemological categories. But according to how our 
cognitive system is constructed, beauty seems to be taken as a 
guide to truth. Nature appears to share the confidence expressed 
i n the medieval formula verum et pulchrum convertuntur—the 
confidence that "true" and "beautiful" are interchangeable, syn­
onymous concepts, both reaching, i n cases of verbal insuffi­
ciency, toward the same Inexpressible. 
The only problem is that this formula hides a naive realism, 
that is, a realism that confuses correlation wi th identity. Con­
summation is only correlated wi th the effect, but cannot as­
sure i t : the experience of evidentness guarantees truth just as 
l i tt le as the experience of orgasm guarantees fertilization. Other­
wise, the whole business of "verification" would not be neces­
sary i n science. 
CONSEQUENCES FOR T H E LORENZIAN CONCEPT OF " W O R K I N G 
HYPOTHESIS" 
I w i l l now outline the consequences of the previous argumenta­
t ion for an evaluation of Piaget's criticism of Lorenz's views. To 
begin w i t h , when we use concepts like "working hypothesis" 
and "necessity," we ought to make clear whether we are arguing 
on the level of subjective or objective reality. Generally, when 
we speak of a "working hypothesis," we have both levels i n 
mind. Objectively, a working hypothesis is characterized by a 
somewhat loose correspondence wi th reality. Subjectively, i t pre­
sents itself as a tentative, not cogent, form of noncommittal 
guesswork. 
This subjective connotation is strictly excluded i n the Lorenz-
ian line of reasoning. As far as the subjective level is con­
cerned, Lorenz would fully agree wi th Piaget as to the cogent, 
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necessary character of the inherited categories of reason. A l l 
he wants to state is that these categories are more than simply 
a means of organizing experience (what Kant had implied)— 
that in fact they also have a representative function, i n that they 
tell something about the structure of the thing-in-itself. On the 
other hand, Lorenz also wants to say that these categories, how­
ever evident, necessary, and unfailing they may appear, are 
nevertheless only a phylogenetic attempt to reach the asymp­
tote of truth. 
If we now turn to the concept of "necessity" as used by Piaget, 
i t seems equally clear that i t can only be meant to denote the 
subjective appearance of the products of thinking. The term 
"necessity" is obviously referring to what I have called the 
"cogent evidentness" of a solution that has come to be a "good 
Gestalt." In fact, Piaget explicitly derives "necessity" out of 
processes of equilibration—and we have seen earlier that, i n 
deed, the establishment of cognitive equilibrium entails the ex-
perience of evidentness. If, however, equilibration processes 
were interpreted as producing "necessity" i n the objective sense 
of being "necessarily true," i t would be hard to see on the basis 
of which epistemological principles (other than naive realism) 
this correspondence should be established. 
Since Lorenz uses the term "working hypothesis" i n a strictly 
objective sense, whereas Piaget's notion of "necessity" must be 
understood to refer strictly to a subjective state of affairs, i t fol­
lows that the two concepts are unable to contradict each other 
i n a logical sense. They could only be seen as contradictory if 
one failed to distinguish between the subjective and objective 
levels,- this, however, would amount to a naive realist position. 
T H E PROBLEM OF LOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL NECESSITY 
It could be argued by Piaget that the above considerations miss 
the point he wanted to make. He could state that, when speak­
ing about "necessity," he was not referring to mere subjective 
cogentness, nor did he mean objective truth in a realist sense; 
rather, what he actually had i n mind was logical validity. A 
proposition like "2 + 2 = 4" is, indeed, not a "working hypothe­
sis" in any sense of the term. It is worth mentioning that Lorenz, 
i n the paper referred to by Piaget, has already dealt at length wi th 
exactly this problem. He says: 
Nothing that our brain can think has absolute a priori validity . . 
not even mathematics with all its laws. The laws of mathematics 
are but an organ for the quantification of external things, and what 
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is more, an organ exceedingly important for man's life . . . which 
thus has amply proved itself biologically, as have all the other "neces­
sary" structures of thought. Of course, "pure" mathematics . . . is, 
as a theory of the internal laws of this miraculous organ of quantifi­
cation, of an importance that can be hardly overestimated. But this 
does not justify us in making it absolute. Counting the mathematical 
number affects reality in approximately the same manner as do a 
dredging-machine and its shovels. Regarded statistically . . . each 
shovel dredges up roughly the same amount but actually not even 
two can ever have exactly the same content. The pure mathematical 
equation is a tautology . . . Two shovels of my machine are absolutely 
equal to each other because strictly speaking it is the same shovel 
each time, namely the number one. But only the empty sentence 
always has this validity. Two shovels filled with something or other 
are never equal to each other, the number one applied to a real ob­
ject w i l l never find its equal in the whole universe. 1 
I doubt, though, whether Piaget would be content with this 
explanation. However tautological mathematics may be, i t is 
certainly not trivial in a psychological sense. Solving a mathe­
matical problem is a genuine act of productive thinking—a kind 
of highly complex interaction of the "dredging machine" wi th 
itself, an interaction not covered by Lorenz's model. 
Mathematical reasoning is an activity of the brain, just like 
any form of empirical problem solving. Thus the initial Pia-
getian question persists: how could a contingent and basically 
defective creature of random mutation and selection ever reach 
a state to produce things like a mathematical equation, which is 
necessarily true because i t is ideaU In fact, this is just the old 
Cartesian riddle of how we can possibly perceive, through a 
mathematician's sloppy drawing on a blackboard, the ideal tr i ­
angle w i t h an angular sum of exactly (and necessarily) 180 de­
grees. 
If, then, our categories of thinking would just reflect the state 
of perfection of our genetically acquired brain hardware, our 
mathematical thinking would, according to this line of argu­
ment, never reach the ideal state of conceiving " 2 4- 2 = 4 ," but 
rather would be confined to something like " 2 + 2 ss 3.98." 
However, this argument implies a very concrete notion of 
isomorphism between mental structures and brain structures. 
Indeed, if a perceived or imagined triangle were nothing else but 
a kind of photographic mapping of a triangle constructed out 
of visual cortex potentials, i t would admittedly be hard to under­
stand how i t could come to have ideal properties—even after an 
infinite duration of phylogenesis! Gestalt theorists were caught 
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i n precisely this kind of argumentation when they postulated 
the existence of "field forces" i n the brain to account for the 
regularities of mental gestalt. 
Blind alleys of this kind can be avoided only if one gives up, 
once and for all, expecting subjective phenomena to be "fac­
similes" of brain processes. It is not the configuration, but the 
meaning of a neural message that can be understood to be di­
rectly represented i n one's consciousness,- the term "meaning" 
(or as Lorenz prefers to say, "information") refers to the en­
vironmental features that would have to be presupposed to 
render the behavioral effects of this neural message optimally 
adaptive. 
Interestingly, this notion implies a complementary relation 
between the limitations of behavior and the degree of regularity 
of the assigned meaning. 
If there were a method to ask Jerome Lettvin's frogs about 
the shape of flies,2 they would probably agree that all flies are 
ideally round—simply because their sensory system does not 
allow any behavioral differentiation wi th respect to the orienta­
tion of the fly. Higher organisms whose sensorimotor equip­
ment enables them to, say, predict the direction i n which the 
fly is most likely to make its next move, have to pay for this 
increased competence wi th some loss of perfect symmetry in 
their representations of the world. 
Viewed from this angle, the Platonic world of pure ideas, 
which to our intuit ion reveals itself behind the distorted 
shadow-world of empirical things, is far from being an asymp­
tote that could never be reached by a cognitive apparatus tin­
kered up by blind mutation and lame selection. On the con­
trary, our ability to conceive of ideal forms and relations is a 
heritage of ancient, primitive stages of our cognitive phy­
logenesis. 
It is i n this realm of ideal forms that we experience logical 
necessity. A syllogism like " A l l X are U ; Y is X; so Y is U " is 
necessarily valid only for a mind that is capable of understand­
ing the idea of areas nested i n such a way as to successively en­
close each other. Only the ideal character of this conceptual 
image supplies the intuition of the nonexceptionable validity, 
that is, the necessity, of the above syllogism. 
To summarize: whoever intends to question the phylogenetic 
origin, and hence the "hypothetical" character, of the basic cate­
gories of thinking, can certainly not do so on grounds of their 
being "necessary" i n the sense of evident, cogent, ideal, and 
perfect. Of course, this leaves entirely aside the question of 
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whether, i n general, the conception of a phylogenesis by way 
of random mutation plus survival of the fittest is a good model. 
As things stand, i t is certainly the only legitimate model avail­
able,- but we ought to be aware that i t does not explain the reality 
of consciousness. Selection, i t is true, enables us to introduce the 
concept of adaptiveness into the description of organisms, hence 
to assign "meanings" to brain processes, meanings that can then 
be taken as descriptions of conscious contents. But this is a 
purely formal procedure, a "manner of speaking" (faQon de 
parier), a way of organizing our knowledge. Consciousness, 
however, is more than a mere formal construct—at least to the 
owner of the brain in question. This reality of consciousness, 
which was only neglected but never validly refuted by be­
haviorism, ought to remind us of the preliminary character of 
our present understanding of nature. 
